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WHEN JUSTICE FAILS 
Stephan Landsman* 
THE HAYMARKET TRAGEDY. By Paul Avrich. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1984. Pp. xv, 535. $29.50. 
I. WHAT WAS THE HAYMARKET TRAGEDY? 
On November 11, 1887, four anarchists were executed for alleg-
edly participating in a bombing attack in Chicago's Haymarket Square 
that resulted in the deaths of more than half a dozen policemen. In 
the narrowest sense this execution and the chain of events that led to it 
constitute the Haymarket tragedy. Paul Avrich suggests that the road 
to Haymarket began in 1877 when a virtually spontaneous strike of 
railroad and other workers swept across the United States to protest 
oppressive management policies and the dismally depressed state of 
the American economy. The great railroad strike shocked the nation. 
Never before had America witnessed a nationwide uprising of workers, 
an uprising so obstinate and bitter that it was crushed only after much 
bloodshed. Local police and state militias alone could not restore order. 
For the first time federal troops had to be called out during peacetime to 
suppress a domestic disturbance. In the process, more than a hundred 
workmen were killed and several hundred wounded. [p. 26] 
The violence of 1877 led the most militant members of the nascent 
American labor movement to adopt a policy of armed self-defense. 
This policy, along with a series of political rebuffs in the late 1870s and 
early 1880s, moved a significant segment of organized labor's left wing 
towards the enunciation of anarchist principles, a step formally taken 
at a congress held in Pittsburgh in 1883. When the United States was 
plunged into yet another depression in that same year, the radicals 
began a period of sustained agitation and organization. The economic 
and political events of the era convinced some of them that the time 
for revolution had arrived and that working people ought to be armed 
and prepared for the final battle against capitalism. 
From 1883 to 1886 the struggle between labor and capital intensi-
fied. Bitter strikes and political violence became ever more common. 
In response, the rhetoric of the radicals became ever hotter. At a pub-
lic meeting in Chicago in 1885, for example, an anarchist speaker 
presented "a scientific treatise on nitro-glycerine as a civilizing agent" 
and praised "the value of dynamite as a great moral factor in solving 
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the problem of capital and labor" (p. 110). These sentiments were 
echoed by a great many others, and amongst anarchists a "cult of dy-
namite" seemed to be growing (pp. 160-77). 
Conflict between employers and employees came to a head in the 
early months of 1886 when a broad coalition of labor organizations 
undertook a campaign for the eight-hour workday. Those leading the 
movement for shorter hours chose May 1, 1886, as the day for the 
commencement of a general strike. The strike had a significant impact 
in Chicago. There all proceeded peacefully until the afternoon of May 
3, when fighting broke out at the McCormick Reaper Works and at 
least two workers were killed (pp. 188-89). 
Chicago's anarchist community was outraged by these killings. A. 
protest meeting was called for the evening of May 4 in Haymarket 
Square. At the same time, a number of armed militant anarchist 
groups began to make plans in the belief that revolution was immi-
nent. Despite the intensity of emotion among radicals, the Haymarket 
meeting was a rather sedate affair. Chicago Mayor Carter Harrison 
was present until around ten p.m. and at that time instructed the po-
lice to dismiss the reserves that had been held in readiness in case of 
trouble (p. 204). After the mayor's departure, Inspector John Bon-
field, the commander of the police, decided on his own authority to 
disperse the remnants of the crowd. As the several hundred police 
under Bonfield's command advanced on the dwindling crowd, a bomb 
was thrown into their ranks. The bomb triggered a fusillade of police 
gunfire. As a result of the bombing and gunfire, seven police officers 
died and sixty more were wounded (p. 208). A like number of citizens 
were killed or wounded (p. 210). 
The bombing provoked what Paul Avrich describes as the first ma-
jor "Red Scare" in American history (p. 215). The press shrilly at-
tacked all anarchists and called for their blood.1 The Chicago police 
launched a campaign of roundups, searches, and seizures that resulted 
in the arrests of hundreds of men and women (p. 221). The two lead-
ing anarchist newspapers, the German-language daily, Arbeiter-
Zeitung, and the English-language bimonthly, The Alarm, were put 
out of business and their staffs incarcerated. Chicago was under vir-
tual "martial law" for nearly eight weeks as meetings were banned, 
speech suppressed, and even the color red "banished from public ad-
vertising" (p. 222). 
It was in this atmosphere that eight of the Chicago area's leading 
anarchists were indicted for the murder of one of the slain policemen. 
Among the eight were several anarchists of national reknown, includ-
I. Avrich quotes the New York Times, which on May 6, 1886, gave the followinj prescrip-
tion: "In the early stages of an acute outbreak of anarchy a Gatling gun, or if the case be severe, 
two, is the sovereign remedy. Later on hemp, in judicious doses, has an admirable effect in 
preventing the spread of the disease." P. 217. 
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ing Albert Parsons, Oscar Neebe, and August Spies, as well as several 
revolutionaries of the most militant stripe, including Adolph Fischer, 
George Engel, and Louis Lingg. The other two defendants were Sa-
muel Fielden and Michael Schwab. The process leading to their in-
dictment was marked by extraordinary prosecutorial excesses. The 
State's Attorney for Cook County Julius Grinnell instructed investi-
gating police to "[m]ake the raids first and look up the law afterward!" 
(p. 221). His assistant Edmund Furthmann conducted a "sweating 
shop" to wring statements from witnesses and potential defendants (p. 
221). Chicago area businessmen "subscribed more than $100,000" to 
the prosecution for expenditures "to help stamp out anarchy and sedi-
tion" (p. 223). This vast sum was used for a variety of purposes, in-
cluding prosecutorial offers of monetary support to various witnesses 
in the case. 2 
Despite the defendants' requests for additional time and for sepa-
rate trials, the cases of all eight of the accused were brought on for 
hearing before Judge Joseph Easton Gary on June 21, 1886. The trial 
was a mockery of justice. Seven years after the event, Illinois Gover-
nor John Altgeld reviewed the case and concluded that the proceed-
ings had been deficient in the following ways: 
FIRST - That the jury which tried the case was a packed jury se-
lected to convict. 
SECOND - That according to the law as laid down by the supreme 
court, both prior to and again since the trial of this case, the jurors, 
according to their own answers, were not competent jurors and the trial 
was therefore not a legal trial. 
THIRD - That the defendants were not proven to be guilty of the 
crime charged in the indictment. 
FOURTH - That as to the defendant Neebe, the state's attorney 
had declared at the close of the evidence that there was no case against 
him .... 
FIFTH - That the trial judge was either so prejudiced against the 
defendants, or else so determined to win the applause of a certain class in 
the community that he could not and did not grant a fair trial.3 
The jurors were selected from a panel chosen by Henry Ryce, a 
special bailiff who, according to subsequent disclosures, had declared 
his intention to pack the jury to convict.4 When this charge was aired 
after trial, the prosecution attempted to persuade a witness with 
knowledge of the jury-packing efforts to refuse to make an affidavit 
about them. 5 At least four of the jurors stated on voir dire that "they 
2. See, e.g., Affidavit of Jacob Mikolanda dated Apr. 14, 1893, reprinted in J. ALTOl!LD, 
REASONS FOR PARDONING FIELDEN, Ni!i!BE AND SCHWAB 53 (1893). 
3. J. ALTOl!LD, supra note 2, at 5. 
4. See Affidavit of Otis S. Favor dated Nov. 7, 1887, reprinted in J. ALTOl!LD, supra note 2, 
at 8-9. 
5. Id. 
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were so prejudiced that they could not try the case fairly."6 They, 
along with a great number of others, were cajoled or pressured by the 
trial judge into conceding that they might be able to change their 
minds and, therefore, serve as jurors. 
The evidence against the defendants was exceptionally weak. The 
actual bomber was never produced in court. Only four of the defen-
dants were tied to the bombing in any way, 7 and this by dubious and 
conflicting testimony drawn, for the most part, from two witnesses of 
suspect reputation.8 As to the other defendants, little was proven ex-
cept that they, at one time or another, had made inflammatory utter-
ances. Their convictions, if justifiable at all, could only be based on a 
novel conspiracy theory that held the defendants liable if they "pub-
licly by print or speech advised or encouraged the commission of mur-
der without designating time, place or occasion at which it should be 
done."9 This theory invited the introduction of all sorts of prejudicial 
material into the case, and led many observers to conclude that the 
defendants were tried and convicted for their beliefs rather than for 
having had any part in the murder of a police officer. In the case of 
defendant Neebe, even this sort of evidence was lacking. The prosecu-
tion also injected prejudice into the case by referring to the defendants 
as "cowards,"10 "assassins," and "godless foreigners" (p. 268), as well 
as by introducing provocative exhibits, including the blood-stained 
uniform of a dead policeman and various demonstrative exhibits relat-
ing to bomb manufacture (p. 276). 
Judge Gary was openly and consistently hostile to the defendants. 
He denied their motions for a delay of trial and for separate trials. His 
courtroom demeanor was marked by the strongest evidence of animos-
ity towards the anarchists. He allowed the prosecution extensive lati-
tude in opening, closing, and examining, while rigidly confining the 
defendants, especially in cross-examination (p. 262). Judge Gary 
6. J. ALTGELD, supra note 2, at 25-29. 
7. The three directly implicated were August Spies, Michael Schwab, and Adolph Fischer. 
Pp. 268-70. The prosecution argued that Louis Lingg might have manufactured the bomb that 
was thrown. P. 273. 
8. The two witnesses were M.M. Thompson and Harry L. Gilmer. Among other things, 
Thompson claimed to have overheard Spies and Schwab confer in English a moment before they 
allegedly handed the deadly bomb to a confederate. This testimony flew in the face of the fact 
that both were German-born and both virtually always spoke German to each other, as well as 
the fact that Schwab had an excellent alibi. Pp. 268-69. Gilmer's testimony was equally ques-
tionable. He claimed Fischer was on the scene when the strongest evidence demonstrated other-
wise. Additionally, ten witnesses swore that Gilmer "was an inveterate liar whom they would not 
believe even under oath." P. 270. 
9. Judge Gary's Charge to the Jury, 1 Abstract of Record at 8, Spies v. People, '122 Ill. 1, 12 
N.E. 865 (1887), reprinted in THE CHICAGO HAYMARKET RIOT: ANARCHY ON TRIAL 57 (B. 
Kogan ed. 1959). 
10. Opening Address of State's Attorney Julius Grinnell, Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1, 12 N.E. 
865 (1887), reprinted in M. SCHAACK, ANARCHY AND ANARCHISTS 392 (1889), and in THE 
CHICAGO HAYMARKET RIOT: ANARCHY ON TRIAL, supra note 9, at 22. 
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played a key part in the tainted jury selection process, and he framed 
the legal theory in a way that encouraged convictions. In an article 
published in 1893, the judge wrote of the verdict that it "was received 
by the friends of social order, wherever lightning could carry it, with a 
roar of almost universal approval"11 and that it should be said of the 
condemned anarchists that 
"the people whom they loved" they deceived, deluded, and endeavored 
to convert into murderers; the "cause they died in" was rebellion, to 
prosecute which they taught and instigated murder; their "heroic deeds" 
were causeless, wanton murders done; and the "sublime self-sacrifice" of 
the only one to whom the words can apply was suicide, to escape the 
impending penalty of the law incurred by murder. 12 
It is not at all remarkable that the jury convicted the eight anar-
chists and fixed death sentences for all but Neebe. The case was ap-
pealed to the Illinois Supreme Court under the caption Spies v. 
People. 13 In a lengthy opinion, the court affirmed the convictions with 
virtual unanimity. The court's decision is noteworthy for its endorse-
ment of almost every ruling of the trial judge. Perhaps a more candid 
evaluation came from Justice Mulkey, who in his brief concurrence 
stated: 
In view of the number of defendants on trial, the great length of time 
it was in progress, the vast amount of testimony offered and passed upon 
by the court, and the almost numberless rulings the court was required 
to make, the wonder with me is, that the errors were not more numerous 
and more serious than they are. 14 
The cavalier nature of this conclusion is especially troublesome in light 
of the facts that seven of the defendants were condemned to die, and 
that the difficulties of the case were attributable to court rulings and 
prosecutorial choices rather than the actions of the defendants. 
The decision in the Haymarket case is even more troublesome be-
cause it was flatly contradicted by the Illinois Supreme Court seven 
years later in Coughlin v. People. 15 There a majority of the court over-
turned a conviction in a case in which jurors were impanelled despite 
their initial avowals of prejudice. The court sought to distinguish 
Spies, where such avowals had not led to reversal, on the theory that 
prejudice in the case of the anarchists was "justified."16 Two judges 
dissented from this extraordinary analysis. One was Justice Magru-
der, who had written the Spies decision. He specifically found that 
11. Gary, The Chicago Anarchists of 1886: The Crime, The Trial, and The Punishment, 65 
THE CENTURY MAGAZINE 803, 807 (1893). 
12. Id. at 837. 
13. 122 Ill. 1, 12 N.E. 865 (1887). 
14. 122 Ill. at 266-67 (Mulkey, J., concurring). 
15. 144 Ill. 140, 33 N.E. 1 (1893). 
16. 144 Ill. at 188, 33 N.E. at 16. 
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there was no difference between Coughlin and Spies. 17 Governor 
Altgeld, in his review of the Haymarket case, stated that "[t]he very 
things which the supreme court held to be fatal errors in the [Cough-
lin] case constituted the entire fabric of [the Spies] case."18 
The supreme court fixed the date of execution as November 11, 
1887. Before that time a substantial clemency campaign was under-
taken with the objective of persuading Illinois Governor Richard 
Oglesby to pardon the defendants. An amnesty association was 
formed, and its efforts led to the gathering of more than 40,000 peti-
tion signatures in a week (p. 338) as well as appeals for mercy from 
some of the leading activists and thinkers of the day, including Samuel 
Gompers and William Dean Howells. Under intense political pressure 
from all sides, Governor Oglesby fashioned what can only be inter-
preted as a compromise solution.19 He granted clemency to two of the 
condemned defendants while sustaining the death sentences of five 
others. Shortly before the date of execution one of the defendants, 
Louis Lingg, took his own life with a small dynamite bomb smuggled 
to him by a friend (p. 376). The remaining four defendants -Albert 
Parsons, August Spies, Adolph Fischer, and George Engel - were 
executed. 
In January 1893, John Altgeld was inaugurated governor of Illi-
nois. The three remaining Haymarket defendants - Samuel Fielden, 
Michael Schwab, and Oscar Neebe - immediately petitioned him for 
pardons. He personally undertook a painstaking examination of the 
entire record. In June of 1893, Governor Altgeld issued a sixty-three-
page report analyzing the legal proceedings and pardoning the defen-
dants. 20 Altgeld's report was a stinging indictment of the trial on the 
five grounds enumerated above. The decision ignited a firestorm of 
controversy in which Altgeld was excoriated as a champion of anar-
chy. Apparently what was most provocative was not the governor's 
decision to pardon the men, but the fact that "he had called the sanc-
tity of the judicial process into question, and with a body of evidence 
so overwhelming that it could not be easily refuted" (p. 425). Altgeld 
was not reelected to a second term as governor. 
The tragedy of the Haymarket affair is to be found not only in 
these events, but in the broader consequences of the bombing. The 
explosion in Haymarket Square and the attendant publicity fixed in 
the American mind the idea that leftists in general and anarchists in 
particular were bloodthirsty madmen with explosive devices spilling 
out of their pockets. The anarchists thus became "arch counselors of 
17. See Coughlin, 144 Ill. at 189-96, 33 N.E. at 16-19. 
18. J. ALTGELD, supra note 2, at 34. 
19. It has been so described in H. DAVID, THE HISTORY OF THE HAYMARKET AFFAIR 457 
(1936). 
20. See J. ALTGELD, supra note 2. 
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riot, pillage, incendiarism, and murder."21 Their social program was 
ignored and their humanity denied. They were grotesquely carica-
tured. Witness, for example, the description of the defendant Samuel 
Fielden given by the Chicago Times on the occasion of his arrest: 
He is a villainous-looking fellow at best, of heavy, stocky build, shoul-
ders broad and slightly stooped, large hands, and muscular arms. His 
head is covered with a thick growth of frowsy rat-colored hair, and his 
face is almost hidden in a mass of whiskers resembling moss-hair. The 
expression of his countenance as a prisoner was in great contrast to that 
as a murder-preaching devil. He it was who made the last speech to the 
socialist crowd on Tuesday night. Then, mounted on a platform, his face 
contorted in a most fiendish shape, he harangued and urged his listeners 
to pillage and kill. He was in his element and felt safe in his backing. 
Yesterday, however, his visage was one of extreme despair and fear. The 
brutal look had given place to one of fearful anxiety, and as he was led 
into the secret room of the police he cast his little ratty eyes about from 
face to face looking in vain for a friendly countenance. A few moments' 
search of his sweaty, sticky clothes disclosed nothing but a dirty hand-
kerchief and numerous circulars appealing to the workingman to take up 
arms, etc.22 
All but one of the Haymarket defendants (Albert Parsons) were 
foreign born. The hatred and anger engendered by the bombing were 
focused not only on radicals but on immigrants as well. The back-
ground of the defendants was constantly emphasized in the press. 
Even Governor Altgeld, who had spent all but the first three months 
of his life in the United States, was branded a foreigner and as such 
untrustworthy (p. 424). The bombing and attendant commentary 
gave new credibility to an old American stereotype - the outside agi-
tator. They fueled American xenophobia, and lent credence to the no-
tion that the ills of the nation could be traced to strangers, minorities, 
and newcomers. The Haymarket case reinforced an American inclina-
tion in certain circumstances to treat aliens as scapegoats and helped 
establish a pattern that has been repeated in a number of famous cases, 
including those of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, Bruno 
21. Chicago Times, May 6, 1886, reprinted in THE CHICAGO HAYMARKET RIOT: ANARCHY 
ON TRIAL, supra note 9, at 14. 
22. Id. at 16. Compare Joseph Conrad's description of the terrorist, Mr. Verloc, in THE 
SECRET AGENT: 
[A]t that signal, through the dusty glass doors behind the painted deal counter, Mr. 
Verloc would issue hastily from the parlour at the back. His eyes were naturally heavy; he 
had an air of having wallowed, fully dressed, all day on an unmade bed. Another man would 
have felt such an appearance a distinct disadvantage. In a commercial transaction of the 
retail order much depends on the seller's engaging and amiable aspect. But Mr. Verloc 
knew his business, and remained undisturbed by any sort of aesthetic doubt about his ap· 
pearance. With a firm, steady-eyed impudence, which seemed to hold back the threat of 
some abominable menace, he would proceed to sell over the counter some object looking 
obviously and scandalously not worth the money which passed in the transaction: a small 
cardboard box with apparently nothing inside, for instance, or one of those carefully closed 
yellow flimsy envelopes, or a soiled volume i.n paper covers with a promising title. 
J. CONRAD, THE SECRET AGENT 4-5 (1907). 
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Richard Hauptmann, Leo Frank, the Scottsboro boys, Angelo 
Herndon, and perhaps even Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. 
II. A VRICH'S ACHIEVEMENTS 
Paul A vrich set himself the task of reconstructing "the story 
around the lives of the anarchists themselves, their hopes and dreams 
and passions" (p. xiii). At its core The Haymarket Tragedy is a group 
biography intended to restore an appreciation of the human qualities 
of a group of men and women whose history has been grossly distorted 
because of misleading reportage and long-lived political stereotypes. 
Avrich succeeds admirably in this endeavor. His portraits of the anar-
chists, their principles, and their passions, are both rich and vivid. His 
work allows the reader to rediscover a number of truly extraordinary 
figures. 
Perhaps foremost among them is Albert Parsons, the one native 
born American among the defendants. A vrich follows the Parsons 
family from its American beginnings in Puritan New England to Al-
bert Parsons' youth in Alabama and Texas. Avrich painstakingly doc-
uments the development of a homegrown radical from his days as a 
boy soldier in the Confederate Army, to advocate of racial equality in 
Reconstruction Texas, to· labor organizer in Chicago, and finally to 
militant anarchist. He shows us the nobility of spirit and boundless 
energy of a man who advocated a different path for America. Avrich 
succeeds in giving Parsons a human face and heart. He prepares us for 
the heroism that led Parsons to surrender himself for trial though he 
had escaped the law's net and could have remained safely out of 
harm's way. 
A vrich also provides a fine portrait of one of the most militant and 
radical anarchists of his day, the defendant Louis Lingg. At the time 
of the Haymarket bombing, Lingg was a twenty-two-year-old recent 
immigrant from Germany who was caught up in the millennial expec-
tation of revolution (pp. 157-59). He was a bomb manufacturer for 
the most radical German-American anarchist groups in Chicago and 
an outspoken advocate of retaliatory violence (pp. 159, 175). He was 
the only defendant to resist arrest, and throughout the legal proceed-
ings he consistently rejected the proposition that a capitalist court 
could make any claim upon him. His path was one of "unflinching 
courage" (p. 359) and led him to take his life with a miniature explo-
sive device smuggled to h~m by a supporter rather than be hung in a 
capitalist prison. For anarchists of the next generation like Emma 
Goldman and Alexander Berkman, Lingg was "the sublime hero" (p. 
377). 
Although many of Avrich's biographical sketches introduce char-
acters of great interest, one other actor in the Haymarket drama 
stands out: the defense team's lead counsel, William Black. Black was 
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a highly successful forty-four year old corporate lawyer when ap-
proached by the anarchists' defense committee. He had been a hero in 
the Civil War and had been awarded the Congressional Medal of 
Honor (p. 250). He initially suggested that the defendants seek coun-
sel with greater criminal experience. His ire was provoked, however, 
when almost the entire criminal defense bar of Chicago shrank from 
the task of representing the Haymarket defendants (p. 251). Despite a 
clear ·appreciation of the risk to his career, Black undertook the case. 
He pressed it with the greatest zeal, adhering throughout to his belief 
in the integrity of the judicial system. His decision to represent the 
anarchists led to the dissolution of his law firm and the loss of the vast 
majority of his business clients (p. 448). Despite these hardships, he 
never wavered in his support for the anarchists. He provides an out-
standing example of the finest qualities of the American lawyer. 
A vrich succeeds in portraying the Chicago anarchists as "men and 
women who have the courage to defy conventional standards of behav-
ior and to withstand hardship and abuse for the sake of principles that 
they believe to be right" (p. xiv). Yet there is something troubling 
about this picture. The rhetoric of the anarchists is so violent as to 
give one pause. Lucy Parsons, Albert's wife, said of the rich in 1885, 
"Let us kill them without mercy, and let it be a war of extermination 
and without pity" (p. 91). August Spies in that same year said "what 
does it matter if some thousands, or even tens of thousands of drones 
are removed during the coming struggle?" (p. 125). And Parsons him-
self, shortly before going into hiding in 1886, wrote, "[i]t must be LIB-
ERTY for the people or DEATH for the CAPITALISTS" (p. 244) 
(emphasis in original). A vrich does not succeed in fully reconciling 
this espousal of violence and the attendant cult of dynamite with the 
noble picture he paints of the anarchists. The difficulty in explaining 
these contradictory pieces of the puzzle is glossed over. Indeed, one is 
tempted to say that there is a touch of hagiography in Avrich's ap-
proach to the Chicago defendants. 
The tendency to canonize the anarchists can be seen in a number 
of sections of The Haymarket Tragedy. Almost as much space is de-
voted to their postconviction speeches as to the proceedings at trial. 
Every arguably generous act of the anarchists is dwelt upon, especially 
Parsons' refusal to seek clemency for himself alone and the group's 
refusal to encourage a last-minute rescue attempt by fellow radicals. 
The final hours of the defendants are presented in the greatest detail 
and seem intended to call to mind either Socrates' death or the events 
in the garden at Gethsemane. We are informed of the sheriff's rejec-
tion of a suggestion by influential citizens that he "secrete the bodies of 
the doomed men lest their burial place become a revolutionary 
shrine," (p. 388) and of the ghastly sufferings of the four executed an-
archists, all of whom "died from slow strangulation" (p. 393). The 
Haymarket defendants were men of high principles, but they were 
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political zealots, not saints. A fuller picture of them would have ad-
dressed the problem inherent in their choice of rhetoric and tactics. 
Avrich deserves credit not only for restoring the humanity of the 
defendants, but also for allowing us to hear their voices. He quotes 
extensively from the socialist and anarchist literature of the era. He 
gives us the anarchists' own words. This is especially valuable with 
respect to the German-speaking radicals who dominated left-wing 
politics in America during the late 1800s. A vrich manages to give us a 
sense of the principles and views of this important segment of the great 
wave of Northern European immigrants who came to America before 
1900. The one criticism to be made about his approach is that he 
makes too little use of the traditional sources of information about the 
case, such as the trial record and appellate opinions. 23 A further an-
noyance for the serious reader is A vrich's use of a citation form that 
makes it exceedingly difficult to identify sources cited in footnotes. 
Ill. THE LEGAL PROBLEM 
One question Paul A vrich does not adequately address in The 
Haymarket Tragedy is why the judicial system failed so grievously in 
the case. He seems to suggest that a miscarriage of justice was inevita-
ble given the nature of American society and the espoused opinions of 
the defendants. In this view, the Chicago anarchists were tragic he-
roes, men of honor and worth caught in the toils of a system they 
could not survive. The idea that the courts were ineluctably fated to 
condemn anarchist defendants is an inadequate explanation for 
Haymarket. A vrich fails to consider the nature of the judicial mecha-
nism and ignores substantial evidence that both the courts and society 
were capable of dealing reasonably with radicals in a range of contexts. 
Judges showed an ability to dispense justice in other cases involving 
radicals,24 and politicians such as Mayor Harrison25 and Governor 
Altgeld displayed both open-mindedness and tolerance. If judicial de-
bacles like Haymarket and similar cases are to be understood, their 
special characteristics must be identified and analyzed. 
The American legal system utilizes a variety of mechanisms to pre-
vent adjudications based on prejudice rather than evidence. Chief 
among these are jury trial, restrictions on judicial ·activism, party re-
23. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court opinion in the case is never cited and its con-
tents are discussed in only the most cursory fashion. 
24. Avrich himself provides a series of examples, including the decision of Judge William 
McAllister upholding a group of workmen's right of assembly, p. 33 (also discussed in J. 
ALTGELD, supra note 2, at 39-42), the judicial victory of socialist candidate Frank Stauber over 
electoral officials who sought to deny him his Chicago aldermanic seat in 1880, p. 48, and the 
leniency shown Lucy Parsons when she was arrested while campaigning for the release of her 
husband. Pp. 337-38. 
25. The mayor appointed socialists to important positions, p. 80, sought to restrain the po-
lice, pp. 98, 197, and supported the movement for an eight-hour workday. P. 183. 
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sponsibility for the adduction of evidence, rules protecting the integ-
rity of the forensic process, and appellate review.26 These methods 
generally insure that decisions will be rendered by the most disinter-
ested factfinders available and that the principles of neutrality and 
fairness will be honored.27 In the criminal setting these rules are aug-
mented by the imposition of a set of ethical prescriptions designed to 
deter excessive prosecutorial efforts to convict. 
Despite the precautions built into the judicial system, grossly bi-
ased and unjust adjudications do occur. On such occasions the proce-
dural protections afforded defendants are ignored and verdicts of 
dubious validity are obtained. Haymarket is but one of a number of 
famous American criminal cases in which it is generally conceded that 
improper procedures and questionable results have marred the sys-
tem's integrity. Others that have been so described include the trial 
and execution of Sacco and Vanzetti,28 the trial and incarceration of 
the Scottsboro boys,29 and the prosecution and condemnation of the 
Rosenbergs. 30 
While each of these cases is unique, they all share certain features 
that may assist us in identifying the particular stresses that cause the 
American judicial system to fail. One crucial factor seems to be the 
social conditions that precede trial. When conditions are especially 
turbulent and the general populace perceives a threat to its way of life, 
the chances of a miscarriage of justice are substantially increased. The 
Haymarket case arose in 1886, a time of intense social unrest both 
because of a severe economic slump and because of extensive labor 
agitation. Sacco and Vanzetti were tried in 1921, a time of economic 
depression, turmoil induced by the recent demobilization of large 
numbers of American soldiers, and a widespread "red scare." The 
Scottsboro boys' first trial took place in 1931 during yet another pe-
riod of economic hardship and attendant social unrest. Finally, the 
26. For a detailed discussion of these mechanisms and their interrelationships, see Laitds· 
man, The Decline of the Adversary System: How the Rhetoric of Swift and Certain Justice has 
Affected Adjudication in American Courts, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 487, 490-99 (1980). 
27. Id. 
28. See Commonwealth v. Sacco, 255 Mass. 369, 151 N.E. 839 (1926); F. FRANKFURTER, 
THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI (1927); L. JOUGHIN & E. MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF 
SACCO AND VANZETTI (1948); F. RUSSELL, TRAGEDY IN DEDHAM (1962). 
29. See Powell v. State, 224 Ala. 540, 141 So. 201, revd. sub nom. Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45 (1932); Norris v. State, 229 Ala. 226, 156 So. 556 (1934), revd. sub nom. Norris v. 
Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); D. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN 
SOUTH (1969). 
30. See United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952); 
Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953); L. NIZER, THE IMPLOSION CONSPIRACY 
(1973); R. RADOSH & J, MILTON, THE ROSENBERG FILE (1983); W. SCHNEIR & M. SCHNEIR, 
INVITATION TO AN INQUEST (1965); J. WEXLEY, THE JUDGMENT OF Juuus AND ETHEL RO-
SENBERG (1955); Cohen, Justice Douglas and the Rosenberg Case: Setting the Record Straight, 10 
CORNELL L. REv. 211 (1985); Parrish, Cold War Justice: The Supreme Court and the 
Rosenbergs, 82 AM. HIST. REV. 805 (1977). 
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Rosenbergs' 1951 espionage trial opened amidst the most intense "red 
scare" in American history and at a time of exceptional international 
tension. In all these cases the public was confronted with social condi-
tions of the most threatening sort. 
But it is not simply the character of the times that produces the 
cause cele'bre. Another essential ingredient seems to be the status of 
the defendants as outsiders who threaten the established order of the 
community. The Haymarket defendants and Sacco and Vanzetti were 
most obviously similar in this regard. They were all, save Albert Par-
sons, European immigrants. In addition, they all shared a belief in a 
political philosophy, anarchism, that was generally perceived as anti-
thetical to American values. It is only slightly more difficult to discern 
the same pattern in the Scottsboro proceedings. There nine young 
black hoboes were accused of raping two young white women on a 
train moving through northern Alabama. Such an act by racial out-
casts was perhaps as provocative a challenge to the Southern system of 
segregation as could be imagined at the time. The difficulty of the case 
was compounded by the fact that the Scottsboro defendants were rep-
resented by a number of Jewish lawyers from New York and sup-
ported by a communist-controlled defense committee.31 The pattern 
was repeated in the Rosenberg case, where a young Jewish couple 
from New York were charged with providing atomic secrets to the 
Soviet Union. One of the keys to the case was their membership in the 
Communist Party, an organization generally perceived in the 1950s as 
the greatest of menaces. All of these cases suggest that at times of 
intense social upheaval defendants perceived as outsiders of a particu-
larly threatening sort will be at special risk in American courts. 32 , 
The presence of these factors is not a guarantee that justice will 
miscarry. In each of the highlighted proceedings, problems particular 
to the case or its participants transformed the potential for injustice 
into the actuality of an unfair proceeding. A key safeguard in most 
cases is the neutrality and passivity of the decisionmaker. Judge and/ 
or jury failed to meet systemic expectations in this regard in each of 
the enumerated prosecutions. Perhaps the most remarkable were the 
juries in the Scottsboro case. In almost a dozen trials, only one juror 
held out for anything less than the prosecution demanded33 despite the 
31. See D. CARTER, supra note 29, at 51-103. 
32. In Britain, by contrast, the most troublesome modem cases have involved men or women 
from within the society who have offended strongly held social mores. See, e.g., A. NOYES, THE 
ACCUSING GHOST OF ROGER CASEMENT (1957) (detailing dubious nature of legal proceedings 
and propaganda campaign - including charges of homosexuality - against Sir Roger Case-
ment, an advocate of Irish independence executed as a traitor in 1916); THE TRIAL OF ROGER 
CASEMENT (G. Knott ed. 1926) (same); TRIAL OF FREDERICK BYWATERS AND EDITH THOMP-
SON (F. Young ed. 1923) (presenting trial record and analysis of criminal prosecution that ap-
pears to have led to execution of adulterous wife more for her sexual behavior than for her 
participation in murder). 
33. See D. CARTER, supra note 29, at 375. 
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denial of one of the alleged victims that there had been a rape,34 the 
testimony of physicians that the medical evidence was not consistent 
with violent assault, 35 and the existence of physical infirmities that 
made it virtually impossible for several of the defendants to have par-
ticipated in a sexual attack. 36 The intense bias of the juries made it 
virtually impossible for the Scottsboro boys to obtain a fair trial. 
Juror bias was also a serious problem in the Haymarket case. In 
twenty-one days of jury selection virtually all of the 981 venire mem-
bers questioned stated that they had fixed prejudices against the de-
fendants (p. 264). The jury that actually tried the anarchists shared 
the same feelings. Only the importunings of the trial judge led venire 
members to concede that they might be able to put aside their 
prejudices. On the weakest sort of evidence, seven of the Haymarket 
defendants were condemned. While less is known about the prejudices 
of the jurors in the Sacco-Vanzetti and Rosenberg cases, substantial 
evidence suggests that jurors in those cases also harbored strong feel-
ings against the defendants. 37 
Judges as well as juries were particularly antagonistic to the de-
fendants in the cases under consideration. The hostility of Judge Gary 
to the Haymarket defendants has already been considered.38 Judge 
Webster Thayer displayed similar animosity in the Sacco-Vanzetti 
case. In his in-court rulings and remarks, Thayer consistently sided 
with or assisted the prosecution;39 and in out-of-court comments, he 
displayed a vicious antagonism towards the Italian anarchists.40 The 
performance of Judge William Callahan in the last series of Scottsboro 
trials was virtually identical to that of Thayer. Again and again Calla-
han intervened in the proceedings to assist the prosecution or hinder 
the defense. 41 Judge Irving Kaufman was far less overtly hostile to the 
defendants in the Rosenberg prosecution. Recent scholarship, how-
ever, suggests that Kaufman's role was quite troubling. It has been 
34. Id. at 232-34. 
35. Id. at 213-14, 227-28. 
36. Id. at 221-22. 
37. See, e.g., L. JoUGHIN & E. MORGAN, supra note 28, at 116 (jury foreman Harry H. 
Ripley quoted shortly before trial of Sacco and Vanzetti as stating "Damn them, they ought to 
hang them anyway"). 
38. See text at notes 11-12 supra. 
39. See F. RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 185. 
40. See F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 28, at 103-07; L. JOUGHIN & E. MORGAN, supra note 
28, at 142-48. Thayer was quoted by an acquaintance as having remarked after ruling on one of 
several post-trial motions, "Did you see what I did with those anarchistic bastards the other day. 
I guess that will hold them for a while . . . . Let them go to the Supreme Court now and see 
what they can get out of them." Id. at 148; see also F. RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 194-95. 
41. See D. CARTER, supra note 29, at 279-305. Judge Callahan's charge to the jury was 
described in the following terms by a reporter for the New York Herald Tribune: "[It] was not 
alone the content of the judge's charges ... which made it a more effective bludgeon against the 
defense than even the oratory of the prosecuting attorneys ... [but also the] significant glares 
from the bench toward Mr. Leibowitz [defense counsel]." Id. at 299. 
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suggested that he was involved in a series of improper ex parte com-
munications with the prosecution before and during the trial, 42 that he 
interfered in the process used by the government to fix its sentence 
recommendation,43 and that after the case left his court he continued 
to press for the swiftest punishment of the defendants.44 In these ac-
tions can be glimpsed an unacceptable lack of evenhandedness. 
It should come as no surprise that biases may influence decisions in 
any system that relies on human beings. It should never be a.ssumed 
that any set of procedures will eliminate all prejudice or that all cases 
will be dealt with fairly. Given the intense social pressures at work 
during the trials I have considered, and the provocative affiliations of 
the defendants, it might be anticipated that an unfair adjudication 
could result. Unfortunately, we generally ignore these propositions 
and cloak all arguably regular proceedings in a mantle of legitimacy. 
Investing all the acts of judges or juries with such credit is dangerous 
because it makes it difficult to admit error without raising doubt about 
the legitimacy of the mechanisms upon which we rely. This was the 
dilemma posed by each of the cases I have reviewed. 
A second safeguard at work in most cases is party control of pro-
ceedings and its criminal law concomitant, restraint on the activities of 
prosecutors. All the cases under discussion were marked by 
prosecutorial misbehavior and by the inability of the defendants to 
counter it by traditional courtroom tactics. In Haymarket, prosecu-
tors Grinnell and Furthmann employed all sorts of tricks to uncover 
or compel testimony. Their repertoire included "sweating" reluctant 
witnesses and making extensive payments from a $100,000 trial fund. 
At trial the Cook County prosecutors went even further and specially 
emphasized those matters likely to engender the grossest prejudice. 
Similar tactics were employed by Frederick Katzmann in the Sacco-
Vanzetti case,45 and Irving Saypol in the Rosenberg case.46 In each of 
these proceedings, the prosecution paid lip service to notions of re-
straint and strove for a conviction at almost any cost. 
The reasons for prosecutorial excess in these cases are not hard to 
understand. In each case the public and political outcry was stronger 
than the countervailing pressure to conform to traditional rules of con-
duct. Prosecutors who are perceived as lax are obvious political 
42. See R. RADOSH & J. MILTON, supra note 30, at 277, 428. 
43. Id. at 281-82. 
44. Id. at 428-30. 
45. See F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 28, at 46-62 (prosecutor's exploitation of radical as-
sociations of defendants), 77-88 (prosecutor knowingly presented misleading ballistics evidence); 
L. JOUGHIN & E. MORGAN, supra note 28, at 94-98, 117-20, 126-31. 
46. See R. RADOSH & J. MILTON, supra note 30, at 244-52 (prosecutor's cross-examination 
of defendant Julius Rosenberg designed to inject question of political affiliations into case), 342-
43 (prosecutor manipulated press coverage to prejudice of defendants); W. ScHNEIR & M. 
SCHNEIR, supra note 30, at 147-48, 181-84. 
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targets, while those who demonstrate an excess of zeal are likely to be 
applauded or even promoted to higher office. 47 The only judicial sanc-
tion for improper conduct is retrial. The prospect of retrial, with its 
attendant publicity, is hardly likely to be classified as a deterrent to 
prosecutors pandering to public prejudice. 
In the four cases I have considered, the defense was overborne by 
the prosecutors' tactics. Where counsel was not particularly skilled, as 
in the first Scottsboro trial48 or in the Rosenberg proceeding,49 the 
conviction of the defendants was virtually uncontested. Even where 
the case was hard fought by a keen legal mind, however, the outcome 
was the same. The great Samuel Liebowitz could not convince even a 
single juror to acquit even one of the Scottsboro boys. The inability of 
defense counsel to counter prosecutorial tactics in each case was di-
rectly related to a judicial or jury bias that could not be overcome. 
Not even a recantation of testimony50 or a strong suggestion of per-
jury51 would satisfy decisionmakers inflamed by prejudice and goaded 
by an ambitious prosecutor. 
The final safeguard built into the judicial process is appellate re-
view. In theory, the courts of appeals stand ready to examine trial 
proceedings and reverse decisions bottomed on violations of important 
procedural or substantive rights. The judges who are assigned respon-
sibility to review criminal prosecutions are a step removed from the 
heat of trial and insulated from political pressure. Theoretically, they 
are in a position to review dispassionately the record and control ex-
cesses by judge, jury, or prosecutor. This sort of review did not take 
place in the four cases under examination. In each, the appellate 
courts took a crabbed view of their obligations or broadly endorsed the 
dubious actions of the trial judge and prosecution. The Illinois 
Supreme Court in its 167-page opinion in the Haymarket case upheld 
the actions of Judge Gary despite a host of difficult legal questions. 
The decision is most troubling because it constituted a major depar-
ture from prior Illinois case law on jury selection and was effectively 
overturned within a few years. 52 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court took a slightly differ-
47. The prosecutor in the Haymarket case was shortly thereafter elevated to the bench, p. 
448, as was Irving Saypol after the trial of the Rosenbergs. See R. RAoosH & J. MILTON, supra 
note 30, at 427. Alabama Attorney General Thomas Knight was elected lieutenant governor 
within a year after his appearance in the Scottsboro case. See D. CARTER, supra note 29, at 273. 
48. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (Scottsboro defendants denied "effective aid in 
the preparation and trial of the case" at their first trial). 
49. See R. RADOSH & J. MILTON, supra note 30, at 188-93 (serious blunders by defense 
counsel at trial). 
50. One of the two alleged rape victims in the Scottsboro case, Ruby Bates, recanted her 
original testimony at the second and subsequent trials. See note 34 supra. 
51. See note 8 supra. 
52. See notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text. 
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ent route in the Sacco-Vanzetti case. The high court doggedly refused 
to examine the problems in the case. The court unanimously insisted 
that its role on review was tightly constricted and repeatedly relied on 
the proposition that the challenged activities were within the trial 
court's discretion.53 In this way, the Supreme Judicial Court evaded 
the hard questions posed by the case. At least one member of the 
Massachusetts court, Justice Edward Pierce, indicated on several later 
occasions that the court's unanimous reliance on technicality masked 
deep dissension within its ranks. 54 • 
The Alabama Supreme Court did not, at least at the outset, seem 
as monolithic as its Massachusetts counterpart. On its first review of 
the Scottsboro case one of the seven justices dissented from the affirm-
ance of the trial proceedings. 55 His view was eventually sustained 
when the United States Supreme Court held that the trials had de-
prived the defendants of due process. 56 The Alabama court's initial 
ruling is troublesome, however, because the trial transcript presents a 
case that cries out for reversal. The refusal of Alabama's high court to 
deal fairly with the Scottsboro defendants was reconfirmed when the 
case came to it for a second time. The court unanimously refused to 
credit the clearest sort of evidence of racial discrimination in jury se-
lection and upheld a trial of the most dubious sort. 51 Again the 
Supreme Court of the United States rejected the findings of the Ala-
bama court, bluntly dismissing the state court's tortured analysis of 
the evidence. 58 
The Rosenberg case was marked by both appellate hypertechnical-
ity and an apparent animus against the defendants. Various aspects of 
the case came before the Second Circuit on a number of occasions. 
Perhaps most noteworthy was the appellate proceeding that addressed 
the prosecutor's misbehavior in making statements to the press. 59 The 
court recognized the troubling nature of the prosecutor's conduct but 
refused to overturn the verdict because of a technicality involving the 
absence of a motion for a new trial. This technical ruling was criti-
cized by Judge Learned Hand when he, along with two colleagues, 
granted a stay of execution to allow an appeal to the Supreme Court. 
53. See F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 29, at 89-90; L. JOUGHIN & E. MORGAN, supra note 
28, at 150-51 ("In its first opinion ... [the Supreme Judicial Court] had to resort to the doctrine 
of discretion on at least sixteen different occasions covering nine distinct points." Id. at 151.). 
54. See L. JouGHIN & E. MORGAN, supra note 28, at 352 (quoting Judge Pierce's remarks to 
Herbert Ehrmann, one of the attorneys who represented Sacco and Vanzetti). 
55. See Powell v. State, 224 Ala. 540, 554, 141 So. 201, 214 (1932) (Anderson, C.J., dissent-
ing), revd. sub nom. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
56. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
57. See Norris v. State, 229 Ala. 226, 156 So. 556 (1934), revd. sub nom. Norris v. Alabama, 
294 U.S. 587 (1935); D. CARTER, supra note 29, at 307-08. 
58. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); D. CARTER, supra note 29, at 322-23. 
59. See United States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1952). 
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Judge Hand said, "People don't dispose of lives, just because an attor-
ney didn't make a point. . . . You can't undo a death sentence. There 
are some Justices on the Supreme Court on whom the conduct of the 
Prosecuting Attorney might make an impression. "60 The Rosenlforg 
case came before the Supreme Court on several occasions. The 
Court's deliberations were marked by the most unsettling tergiversa-
tions and resulted in its refusal to entertain the matter. 61 This decision 
was reversed when Justice Douglas granted a stay of execution after 
the Court had ended its term. Then, in an unprecedented move and 
with the most unseemly haste, the Court reconvened and, in cursory 
fashion, considered and rejected the Rosenbergs' arguments, thus con-
demning them to death. 62 
In all four of the cases I have discussed, the courts of appeals acted 
in ways that were inconsistent with a fair and full review. What moti-
vated them to act in this way is difficult to say. It is likely, however, 
that the same animosities that inflamed jurors and trial judges alike 
may have touched the men sitting on the appellate bench. Moreover, 
the criticisms made about the behavior of the lower courts probably 
put pressure on the reviewing panels to support the frontline judges 
and affirm the integrity of the system in the face of attacks made on 
behalf of outsiders with anti-establishment views. 
Haymarket and the other cases reviewed demonstrate that the sys-
tem can fail. The question that remains is why it does not cave in to 
prejudice and fail in a much larger number of cases. The answer to this 
question is perhaps to be found in the notion that the judicial system 
can only succeed if its legitimacy is accepted by the vast majority of 
the populace. 63 If citizens come to regard their courts as instruments 
that serve but a single point of view, they are not likely to respect 
judicial decisions. Absence of respect in turn leads to a refusal to par-
60. Hand's statement is quoted in J. WEXLEY, supra note 30, at 494. 
61. The gyrations of the Supreme Court are neatly documented in Parrish, supra note 30; see 
also R. RADOSH & J. MILTON, supra note 30, at 397-412. 
62. Parrish, supra note 30, at 833-36. 
63. Most men have a strong sense of justice, at least with regard to their own interests. If 
the law is evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, legitimize nothing, contrib· 
ute nothing to any class's hegemony. The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law, 
in its function as ideology, is that it shall display an independence from gross manipulation 
and shall seem to be just. It cannot seem to be so without upholding its own logic and 
criteria of equity; indeed, on occasion, by actually being just. And furthermore it is not 
often the case that a ruling ideology can be dismissed as a mere hypocrisy; even rulers find a 
need to legitimize their power, to moralize their functions, to feel themselves to be useful 
and just. In the case of an ancient historical formation like the law, a discipline which 
requires years of exacting study to master, there will always be some men who actively 
believe in their own procedures and in the logic of justice. The law may be rhetoric, but it 
need not be empty rhetoric. Blackstone's Commentaries represent an intellectual exercise 
far more rigorous than could have come from an apologist's pen. 
E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 263 (1975) (empha-
sis in original); see I. BALDUS, THE DIALECTICS OF LEGAL REPRESSION 1-40 (1973); o. 
KIRCHHEIMER, PoLmCAL JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURES FOR POLITICAL ENDS 
3-21 (1961). 
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ticipate in the system. 64 To avoid these results and retain popular alle-
giance, courts must give the appearance of neutrality and fairness. 
Hence, each time the courts appear to abandon evenhanded principles 
they risk popular disaffection and desertion. It would appear that in 
cases like the ones I have considered, the desire to punish particularly 
threatening opponents of the system is so great that it overcomes prin-
ciples of neutrality. If this were allowed to happen too frequently, 
however, the system could not retain its legitimacy. To abandon, even 
once, supposedly sacrosanct principles is the most unsettling sort of 
action. It threatens the very foundation of the system. Actors within 
the system appear intuitively to appreciate this and to choose, in most 
cases, to turn aside from temptation. 65 
The restoration of legitimacy after a serious breach of the rules is 
difficult. It is generally commenced, as in each of the cases discussed, 
when a broad-based outcry against the injustice of the decision is 
made. 66 This sort of agitation triggers a variety of governmental re-
sponses, including denial of impropriety and extreme defensiveness. 
Yet such outcries seem to serve as warnings to the courts not to con-
tinue to allow prosecutions by prejudice. The cause cele'bre usually 
fixes the high water mark of bias. The defendants in such cases seem 
to serve as the sacrifices by which a large measure of evenhandedness 
is eventually restored, and the participants in the system are reminded 
of the importance and fragility of legitimacy. 
The Haymarket Tragedy is an important book both because of its 
effort to strip away the stereotypes that prevent us from understanding 
our political history and because of the questions it raises about the 
delicate nature of our system of justice. It deserves to be widely read 
and to be used as a springboard for further consideration of the way 
we deal with hard cases in our courts. 
64. See E.P. THOMPSON, supra note 63; Markovits, Law or Order - Constitutionalism and 
Legality in Eastern Europe, 34 STAN. L. REV. 513, 552-61 (1982) (workers avoid socialist legal 
forums perceived as unconcerned with protecting litigants' rights). 
65. See I. BALBUS, supra note 63 (In response to widespread civil disorders of the middle 
1960s courts first used repressive tactics that ignored individual rights, but once order was re-
stored they returned to enforcement of a full panoply of rights as a means of reestablishing their 
legitimacy in the eyes of the community.). 
66. See L. JOUGHIN & E. MORGAN, supra note 28, at 221-97 (detailing work of Sacco-Van-
zetti Defense Committee and national debate about fairness of trial); D. CARTER, supra note 29, 
passim (discussing role of International Labor Defense in defending Scottsboro defendants and 
national outcry about the case); R. RADOSH & J. MILTON, supra note 30, at 347-60 (discussing 
operation of National Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case and international agi-
tation on behalf of defendants). 
